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OPINION OF THE COURT
FULLAM, District Judge

The appellants, Willem Ridder, Lyndon C. Merkle, John
T. Hurst and Gregory DeVany, were employed by City Collateral and
Financial Services, Inc. a wholly owned subsidiary of City
Federal Savings Bank, which in turn was the wholly owned
subsidiary of appellee CityFed Financial Corporation ("CityFed"),
a Delaware corporation now in receivership.

Resolution Trust

Corporation ("RTC"), as receiver for CityFed, has sued the
appellants in a companion case in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, et al., case No. 92l003(D.N.J.), asserting that the appellants committed various
frauds and breaches of their fiduciary duty to their employer.
Specifically, the RTC asserts that appellants (l) exceeded their
authority by approving loans to Northwest Mortgage Co., Inc., (2)
concealed Northwest's default from CityFed's credit committee,
(3) misrepresented to the credit committee the status of the
Northwest line of credit, (4) misstated to the committee the
risks associated with the Northwest loan, (5) concealed
Northwest's criminal activity from CityFed, (6) falsified City
Collateral records, and (7) improperly divulged confidential
information for personal gain.

Upon being served with the complaint in the RTC action,
appellants made demand upon CityFed to advance funds for
attorneys fees they would incur in defending the RTC litigation.
CityFed refused, whereupon appellants brought this action to
compel CityFed to advance attorneys fees to them.

Plaintiff

sought a preliminary injunction to obtain immediate payment, and
also filed a motion for summary judgment.

After a hearing, the

district court denied both motions, and appellants timely filed
this appeal.
Article XI of CityFed's by-laws requires CityFed to
indemnify and hold harmless all employees sued or threatened to
be sued by reason of such employment by CityFed or any of its
subsidiaries, "to the fullest extent authorized by the Delaware
corporation law", and specifically provides that the right to
indemnity "shall include the right to be paid the expenses
incurred in defending any such proceeding in advance of its final
disposition; provided, however that, if the Delaware Corporation
Law so requires [it does] the payment of such expenses ... shall
be made only upon delivery to the corporation of an undertaking
... to repay all amounts so advanced if it shall ultimately be
determined that such employee is not entitled to be indemnified."
[Emphasis added.]

These by-law provisions are substantially

identical to the provisions of the Delaware Corporation Law on
the subject.

The district court denied the injunction sought by
appellants for two reasons.

Because of the perceived strength of

the RTC's case against the appellants in the related litigation,
the court concluded that appellants had failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits.

And, in view of the fact

that CityFed is in receivership and the rights of other creditors
are implicated, the court felt that the harm to appellants from
denial of the injunction was outweighed by the public interest in
assuring equal treatment to all of CityFed's creditors, and that
appellants' claim should not be accorded priority by the issuance
of a preliminary injunction.

We conclude that neither reason

suffices to justify denial of the relief plainly mandated by the
by-laws and the Delaware statute.
The issue before the district court was not whether
appellants were likely to prevail in the RTC litigation, but
whether they were likely to prevail in their assertion that
CityFed should advance the costs of defense.

Under Delaware law,

appellants' right to receive the costs of defense in advance does
not depend upon the merits of the claims asserted against them,
and is separate and distinct from any right of indemnification
they may later be able to establish.

Citadel Holding Corp. v.

Roven, 603 A.2d 8l8 (Del. l992); Salaman v. National Media Corp.,
No. C.A. 92C-0l-l6l, l994 WL465534 (Del. Super. July 22, l994).
See Joseph Warren Bishop, Jr.,

Law of Corporate Officers and

Directors Indemnification and Insurance, ¶6.27 (l98l & Supp.

l993).

Indeed, the provisions in both Article XI of CityFed's

by-laws and §l45(e) of the Delaware corporation law, conditioning
the obligation to advance defense costs upon an undertaking "to
repay such amount if it shall ultimately be determined that [the
officer] is not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation"
leaves no room for argument on that score.
CityFed urges us to adopt the approach taken by the
district court in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn v.
Felicetti, 830 F.Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. l993), and rule that,
notwithstanding the by-law provision, CityFed was justified in
refusing to advance defense costs because of "the overriding duty
of the directors to act in the best interests of the
corporation".

Id., at 269.

We respectfully disagree.

Given a

choice between decisions of the appellate courts of Delaware and
courts of other jurisdictions, on issues of Delaware law, this
court is plainly required to follow the decisions of the Delaware
courts.

Moreover, we find the reasoning in Felicetti

unpersuasive.

Rarely, if ever, could it be a breach of fiduciary

duty on the part of corporate directors to comply with the
requirements of the corporation's by-laws, as expressly
authorized by statute.
The statutory provisions authorizing the advancement of
defense costs, conditioned upon an agreement to repay if a right
of indemnification is not later established, plainly reflect a
legislative determination to avoid deterring qualified persons

from accepting responsible positions with financial institutions
for fear of incurring liabilities greatly in excess of their
means, and to enhance the reliability of litigation-outcomes
involving directors and officers of corporations by assuring a
level playing field.

It is not the province of judges to second-

guess these policy determinations.
Appellants made a strong showing that, unless defense
costs were advanced to them, their ability to defend the RTC
action would be irreparably harmed.

Appellee made no contrary

showing, and the district court did not base its holding upon the
absence of irreparable harm, but rather upon a comparison between
the harm to appellants and the perceived harm to other creditors
of CityFed.

Here again, however, we conclude that the district

court addressed the wrong issue.

The only issue before the

district court was whether appellants were entitled to advance
payment of the cost of defense of the RTC action.

The

insolvency proceeding itself was not before the district court,
and the impact, if any, of a grant of injunctive relief was not
only a matter for other tribunals to decide, but, on this record,
purely speculative.
We conclude that the appellants are entitled to have
their costs of defense advanced to them, as a matter of law.

The

order appealed from will therefore be reversed, with instructions
to issue an injunction requiring appellee to advance such defense

costs as the parties by agreement, or the district court upon
further proceedings, determines to be reasonable.

